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 Abstract 
This paper argues that an adequate approach to the firm should be able to 
accommodate the complexities of actual firm development. The latter is 
conceptualized in terms of three general stages: prime movers or drivers of change, 
change processes, and change attractors. Furthermore, any “real-world” firm is both a 
technical and an institutional unit. To emphasize the importance of “real firm” 
analysis, the discussion presented here revolves around an understanding of the much 
considered case of General Motors and Fisher Body integration has developed over 
time. Generalization from this case suggests that an integrated view of the firm is 
necessary that combines the three stages and the two bases (technical and 
institutional). Six general perspectives on the firm are identified as having technical or 
institutional bases  that are relevant in each of the three stages. This integrated 
approach to the firm is explored in terms of the general topic of firm development. It 
is concluded that, without an integrated approach to firm development, a potentially 
biased or incomplete analysis can result. 
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The basic message of this paper is that an adequate analysis of firm development 
requires an integrated framework based on differing theoretical perspectives. The 
background reasoning here can be set out as follows. The complexities involved with 
firm development require recognition of three general sets of factors: (1) the prime 
movers or drivers of firm change; (2) change processes; and (3) attractors for any firm 
change. It is apparent, therefore, that in discussions of firm development, differing 
perspectives on the same event can exist because particular analytical traditions 
(implicitly or explicitly) have a primary focus on one of these factors. For example, 
Coase (2006) criticizes ‘hold up’ explanations of General Motors’ integration with 
Fisher Body. But, as set out below, the reason for the disagreement appears to be that 
‘hold up’ can be classified as an attractor of the integration decision, whereas Coase 
appears to be concentrating on the drivers and process of the integration. We follow 
Coase in the current discussion by using the General Motors – Fisher Body case. The 
reason for this is that the case has been examined in great detail and the evolution of 
this discussion can be viewed as a useful “natural intellectual experiment” to illustrate 
the analysis of firm development suggested here. 
1. Introduction 
 
To develop an analysis of firm development consistent with these principles, it would 
seem to be necessary to echo the approach of Coase. He emphasized (1937, p. 386) 
that we require ‘a definition of a firm … which is … realistic in that it corresponds to 
what is meant by the firm in the real world’. In reality, the firm is obviously 
a technical unit, i.e. it is a unit that transforms factor inputs into outputs. Following 
Machlup (1967), this involves the manner in which production and cost functions 
interact with demand on the market. But equally the firm is an institutional unit 
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involving questions of basic definition, identity, internal structure and external 
boundaries (Hodgson, 2002). It follows that the firm in the “real world”, to echo 
Coase once again, is both technical and institutional.  
 
There is no real claim of originality in this conceptualization of the “real world” firm. 
For example, in a recent work Langlois (2007, p 66) claims that “Industrial structure 
is really about two interrelated but conceptually distinct systems: the technology of 
production and organizational structure that directs production. These systems jointly 
must solve the problem of value [creation]”. Similarly, Casson (1997) separates 
economic activity into real and control spheres. But the current discussion takes this 
“real world” observation further. Each of the three stages of firm development, i.e. 
drivers of change, change processes and attractors for change, has different technical 
and institutional underpinnings. It follows that, without an integrated framework, 
involving analysis of the drivers, processes and attractors of firm change, a potentially 
biased or incomplete view of firm activity can result. This possible bias is illustrated 
in the General Motors - Fisher Body case study presented in this paper. 
 
The rest of the discussion is organized as follows. In the next section, the nature of an 
integrated view of the firm is developed, based on an exploration of the way in which 
the different conceptual linkages of the firm as a technical and institutional unit can be 
reconciled. This section is basically a background literature review. Following this, 
section three considers research strategy and hypothesis development in the light of 
the discussion in section two. These two background sections (two and three) lead 
into the discussion of the General Motors – Fisher Body case in section four. The 
primary objective here is to show that the different views offered, when early and 
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more recent analysis is compared, suggest an analysis of the firm consistent with the 
earlier background discussion of the nature of “real” firms. Finally, in sections five 
and six, the divergent analyses of the case are generalized in terms of an integrated 
perspective on the firm and its development. Finally, brief conclusions are drawn.    
 
In this section, we consider possible issues involved with the conceptualization of real 
world firms. This involves a basic discussion of the nature of the suggested integrated 
approach to the firm that is developed here using the discussion of the case study and 
facilitating its analysis. A central complexity at the heart of the discussion is that, if 
real world firms are both technical and institutional, there is no single view of the firm 
as an institutional unit, with the implication that there is (in principle) no single 
mapping between institutional and technical definitions.  
2. Conceptualizing real-world firms: literature review 
 
To simplify matters, we suggest that the firm as an institutional unit appears to exist in 
economics in two guises: the firm as an economizer and the firm as a strategizer (for 
want of a better term), or, equivalently, the firm as a follower and the firm as a 
leader 1
                                                 
1 This distinction is equivalent to the categories of innovator versus adaptator used in Lazonick (1991). 
. Using, for example, Saviotti (1996) and Nooteboom (2004), we can 
understand that these two categories of firm are not just theoretical devices but they 
also carry empirical content because of different cognitive requirements. 
Homogeneity of the knowledge base of a firm is a necessary characteristic of high 
performing activity. But, variety and novelty of cognition is appropriate for a firm 
when strategic leadership issues are important, for instance, when new technological 
trajectories are available involving a rupture with the knowledge base that previously 
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existed. To us, this necessary variety implies that generating focus is a key 
organizational/managerial task with attendant costs. 
 
Figure 1 here, see end 
Figure 2 here, see end 
 
In schematic terms, the general linkages involved with these two approaches (efficient 
motivator and long-run focus) are summarized in Figures 1 and 2. The institutional 
firm as an economizer or follower has a core theoretical focus based on efficient 
motivation, as exemplified in the transaction cost work of Oliver Williamson (1975, 
1985). For example, Williamson (1991) suggests that approaches to the business firm 
cluster under two general headings: “strategizing” and “economizing”. In addition, he 
claims that “… economizing is more fundamental than strategizing …” and 
furthermore that this “is the central and unchanging message of the transaction cost 
economics perspective” (p. 76). In Figure 1, basic technical characteristics, and in 
particular asset specificity, along with bounded rationality and opportunism, produce 
motivation problems. This reflects Williamson’s approach based on economizing 
existing transaction costs that arise from the misuse of standard factors of production, 
along with well-defined production functions that require an alignment of incentives. 
The problems are managed using the most efficient, i.e. transaction cost minimizing, 
institutions. Hence, the exogenous technical characteristics are drivers of change and 
the motivation problems and efficient responses are attractors of change. This 
approach is explicitly ex-post in its logic, i.e., the firm as an institution emerges 
following motivation problems. But the same abstract reasoning is evident with 
the ex-ante logic of agency theory in which optimal contracts are developed to 
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manage motivation issues given information asymmetries; for example, Hart’s (1995) 
financial theory of the firm. Finally, the property rights approach of Alchian and 
Demsetz (1972) illustrates the same abstract logic, in which team production produces 
motivation problems and a requirement for hierarchical management. Presenting the 
“efficient motivator” approaches in this way reveals that they all have a common 
methodological root grounded in a comparative static method. The firm as an 
institution emerges in response to exogenous technical characteristics. This is 
transparent in, for example, new institutional approaches to accounting (see Dietrich 
2001). Alternatively, the same logic is transparent in Milgrom and Roberts (1992), but 
also in Greenwood and Jovanovic (1999), Hobijn and Jovanovic (2001), Brynjolfsson 
et al. (2002) on the issue of ‘intangible assets’, which suggest that new flexible 
technologies  reduce asset specificity and hence lead to vertical disintegration because 
of transaction cost factors. This has been further developed in Rajan and Zingales 
(2001), who consider that technological and financial revolutions have had an impact 
on the nature of firms. All these contributions echo previous developments in finance 
theory, such as Merton’s and Scholes’ Nobel lectures (1998), where the ‘firm of the 
future’ was considered as of an organizational form far different from earlier forms, 
with option theory virtually offering protection against all contingencies, including 
potentially opportunism.  
 
The institutional firm as a strategizer or leader emphasizes the long-run focus of the 
firm, hence the term used in Figure 2. Here the driver of change is firm strategy or 
characteristics, with change processes being governed by what is termed in Figure 2 a 
firm’s productive opportunity. Hence there is no obvious attractor of change because 
the future is not known and has to be imagined. Therefore, the emphasis is placed on 
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processes. This general approach is exemplified in neo-Austrian approaches to the 
firm (for example Langlois, 2003; Langlois and Robertson, 1995). Here a distinction 
is drawn between long-run and short-run transaction costs. Short-run transaction costs 
are those that exist in traditional (Williamsonian) theory. Long-run transaction costs 
are incurred with the management of strategic reorientation. The approach is neo-
Austrian because ignorance and tacit knowledge produce profit opportunities for 
particular firms. But the exploitation of these opportunities is not costless, as appears 
to be the case in traditional Austrian economics (for example Hayek, 1945);, but 
rather, it involves investment in managerial and complementary assets. These long-
run transaction costs would not exist in a world in which long-run, firm specific, 
profit opportunities did not exist. 
 
Consistent with the neo-Austrian approach is the competence approach to the firm 
(for example, Foss and Loasby 1998; Krafft, 2000). This builds on the earlier work of 
Penrose (1959), Richardson (1972) and Nelson and Winter (1982). The idea of 
managed long-run focus is explicit in the work of Penrose; the term “productive 
opportunity” in Figure 2 is taken from her work. In the work of the post-Marshallian 
Richardson, and in the evolutionary approach of Nelson and Winter, long-run focus 
still exists but is more emergent (to use Mintzberg’s (1990) term) rather than 
explicitly planned. But whether firm specific opportunities are emergent or planned is 
somewhat irrelevant for the reason that firm performance is not explained as a 
comparative static response to exogenous technical characteristics. Instead, the 
technical and organizational characteristics of the firm are endogenous to the long-run 
focus of firms. This approach is explicit in the dynamic capabilities approach to the 
firm (for example Teece and Pisano, 1994). 
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This section draws out key methodological implications of the literature presented in 
the previous section. These methodological matters facilitate analysis of the General 
Motors – Fisher Body case study (to be developed later in section four). The intention 
here is to avoid reducing the case to a descriptive entity. 
3. Research strategy and hypotheses development 
 
3.1. Research strategy “the firm as efficient motivator” 
Major neo-institutionalist approaches to industrial organization, namely transaction 
costs, agency theory and property rights generally, play an important role in empirical 
contributions since they offer a simple, suitable framework. Compared to neoclassical 
theories of the firm, neoinstitutionalist approaches certainly render the connection 
between the representation of real world firms possible and apparently 
straightforward, since they focus on the same object of study: the firm as a complex 
system of interactions, the boundaries of which may evolve over time. From this 
perspective, empirical contributions have shown that institutional forms are modified 
over time and that these modifications can be explained by motivation problems, as 
technical characteristics favor the emergence of private information and opportunism 
(Shelanski and Klein, 1995). These approaches seem to be affected, however, by three 
major limits when one wants to develop an analytical framework able to 
accommodate the complexities of real firm development. The first concerns the 
‘comparative analysis of institutions’ (Williamson, 1989, p. 136), which assumes that 
the definition and the comparison of respective efficiencies of different forms of 
institutions are possible. Within this type of analysis, nothing can be said about the 
emergence, evolution and viability of institutional or industrial forms. The second 
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limitation is connected to the deductive method, which is often used in the 
connections between theoretical analysis and empirical work. The third limitation is 
related to the systematic reduction of complex phenomena involving the evolution of 
industrial activities to simpler issues such as firm motivation in a context of 
imperfection or asymmetry of information.  
 
The key hypotheses of the research strategy “the firm as an efficient motivator” are 
that they naturally articulate the empirical work to be produced from the theoretical 
framework, and also strongly condition the representation of real world firms. 
 
a) Comparative analysis of institutions 
This explicitly involves the idea that one can compare different forms of institutions 
in order to define an optimal structure. This notion was extensively used in transaction 
cost analyses, and also in other dominant neo-institutionalist approaches such as 
agency theory and property rights. In all of these theories, the costs and advantages of 
alternative forms of institutions (firms, market, cooperation) are evaluated, and this 
evaluation exhibits an efficient solution to information and incentive problems. This 
procedure is not significantly different from inter-temporal optimization and even 
mechanical convergence towards equilibrium, all neoclassical notions that have 
always been so comprehensively rejected as soon as evolution is considered. The 
major problem is that the question of the evolution of institutional forms and the 
progressive predominance of one mode over another is reduced to the instantaneous 
calculus of the optimal solution, i.e. the attractor of change. The issue of change in 
real time, in which actors interact concretely and coordinate progressively, is 
neglected, although it is central to the study of a firm’s long run focus. Hence, 
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reliance on optimality makes it difficult to handle anything other than comparative 
statics, since out of equilibrium means that someone must be failing to optimize.  
 
b) Deductive method and confirmation 
The relation between theories and facts is always critical. The predominance of a 
deductive method naturally leads economists to consider realworld phenomena as 
potential illustrations of their theoretical frame. In the research strategy “the firm as 
an efficient motivator”, the sequence of this reasoning can be summarized in the 
following way: theoretical hypotheses are defined => the optimal organizational 
structure for the firm/industry is determined => empirical applications are defined. 
Confrontation between different evidence coming from the empirical study of real 
world firms, in the context of different theoretical approaches, is thus not 
characteristically the priority. For instance, vertical integration in real world firms 
often involves complexity, as one product may be a member of several filières. The 
literature on ‘the firm as an efficient motivator’ only considers a single production 
sequence and reduces intrinsically the degree of complexity, presumably for possible 
applications to the framework. 
 
c) Focus on the motivation 
The focus on motivation problems is not a problem in itself. Most of the advances in 
industrial organization since the 1970s, and especially all approaches that enter into 
the research strategy “the firm as an efficient motivator”, are centered on this 
question. A difficulty emerges, however, when this focus becomes exclusive in that it 
obscures other questions, such as the study of a firm’s long run focus. Raising this 
issue hinges on the essential distinction between knowledge and information. The 
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motivation problem discussed here arises essentially from differences in information. 
If everyone has full information and everything could be arranged ex ante, then 
opportunism would be impossible. In addition, the information content of any 
message is identical for all recipients, and there is no problem of knowledge. 
Consequently, this literature misses any incentive to develop knowledge, which has 
been recognized (by, for instance, Smith, Marshall and Schumpeter) as essential to a 
theory of development.  
 
 
3.2. Research strategy “the firm as long run focus”  
Though less well recognized compared to transaction cost theory, agency theory and 
property rights theory, the firm as long run focus requires a recombination of existing 
frameworks. This research strategy centers on the evolution, development and 
accumulation of competences. The representation of the real firm is characterized by 
three new elements, which may give content to the development of new hypotheses 
supporting the representation of real world firms. 
 
a) Diversity and evolution of institutions 
Following Coase (1972, p. 60-64) in a famous paper on how to define the empirical 
program in the field of economics of the firm and industrial organization, we 
primarily have to focus on the way in which the activities undertaken are divided up 
among firms, namely why and how some firms embrace many different activities 
while for others the range is narrowly circumscribed; why and how some firms are 
large and others small; why and how some firms are vertically related and others not2
                                                 
2 In this program, the ‘activities’ to be undertaken are not defined by a production function but require 
specific ‘knowledge how’, including how to integrate activities. For a complete analysis of this see 
Nooteboom (2009), winner of the 2010 Schumpeter prize. 
. 
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The issue here is to describe and to analyze the manner in which the firm and the 
industry are organized now, but also how they differ from what they were in earlier 
periods. The connection between theory and evidence requires an understanding of 
the forces that were operative in bringing about a given organization at the level of the 
firm or the industry, and how these forces have changed over time. The emphasis, 
therefore, is on concrete drivers and processes of change. 
 
b) Inductive method and confrontation 
The issue here is to capture regularities in observed phenomena and elaborate on this 
basis plausible and testable assumptions to understand these regularities. The analysis 
under the research strategy “the firm as a long-run focus” centers on the process by 
which a given trend of evolution has been achieved, and also why divergent paths 
may exist. The sequence of reasoning is here: observed organizational structures are 
determined => regularities and anomalies are characterized and confronted to 
theoretical results => new theoretical propositions are generated.  
 
c) Focus on long run focus and the coordination of production 
The coordination of productive activities is an essential problem in innovation, but too 
often neglected. The reintroduction of this key element in the understanding of the 
real world firm is thus an important step. However, one should be aware that the 
exclusive focus on this type of approach may also generate similar drawbacks as the 
exclusive focus on the motivation problem. As a consequence, the connection 
between facts and theory should develop on the basis of a new mode of confrontation: 
not only the traditional confrontation between theories and facts, but also between 
different theories, some oriented towards the motivation problem and the firm as an 
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efficient motivator, and some oriented towards the coordination of production 
according to a long run focus. This issue is further examined below, following 
discussion of the case study. 
 
Recognizing the potential relevance of the views of the firm illustrated in Figures 1 
and 2 suggests an inevitable complexity in the conceptualization of the economics of 
the firm. Before considering this abstract development of an integrated view of the 
firm, the discussion will turn to the General Motors – Fisher Body case. This case is 
valuable because, if the evolution of the analysis and documentation is examined, it 
illustrates the key message being emphasized here that real world firms involve 
multiple linkages between technical and institutional factors. Hence, it provides a 
“laboratory” case of the general analysis provided in this section. 
 
General Motors/Fisher Body (hereafter GM/FB) has certainly been one of the most 
extensively discussed historical cases in the literature on the development of the firm 
and specifically on vertical integration. As such, it provides a useful example of a 
“real world” firm that can inform later conceptual development. The core objectives 
of this section are to show (1) how the analysis of this case has evolved, and (2) that 
the different perspectives offered suggest a view of the firm that should accommodate 
technical and institutional factors as well as drivers, processes and attractors of 
change, as set out above.  
4. The evolution of the General Motors/Fisher Body case 
 
For a long time, and for most of the commentators (Klein, Crawford and Alchian, 
1978; Joskow, 1988; Shelanski and Klein, 1995; Crocker and Masten, 1996), this case 
-13- 
was essentially considered as an example of hold up in the presence of asset 
specificity. In 1926, General Motors acquired its supplier of automobile bodies, Fisher 
Body, because Fisher Body held up General Motors. It is generally claimed that 
Fisher Body did this by locating its body plants far away from the General Motors 
assembly plants and by adopting inefficient methods of production, thus increasing 
both the cost of producing bodies and the profits of Fisher Body under its cost-plus 
contract. This interpretation justified the historical relevance of a new institutional 
interpretation of the economics of the firm, based on the minimization of transaction 
costs (Tirole, 1988; Carlton and Perloff, 1994; Williamson, 1985; Ricketts, 1994). But 
new evidence has been provided, by, for example, Coase (2000), Freeland (2000), 
Casadesus-Masanell and Spulber (2000), which tends to suggest that the dominant 
explanation based on transaction costs problems is not universally accepted, and even 
that such an explanation has tended to neglect other major determinants of vertical 
integration.  
 
To analyze these differing perspectives on the GM/FB case, we will refer to the 
dominant hypothesis, in which “holdup is the main rationale for vertical integration”, 
(see Table 1 below), as hypothesis H0. This null hypothesis is supported by Klein 
(2000), who reaffirms his initial idea with Crawford and Alchian that the facts of the 
GM/FB case are fully consistent with a hold up description. To him: 
the evidence unambiguously demonstrates that while the contract initially 
worked well, this contract broke down in 1925 when GM’s demand for Fisher 
bodies increased dramatically. Fisher then refused to make the necessary 
capital investments required to produce bodies efficiently for GM, in particular 
refusing to build an important body plant close to GM production facility in 
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Flint, Michigan. These contractual difficulties were the primary reason GM 
decided in 1926 to vertically integrate with Fisher Body. (Klein, 2000, p. 106) 
 
In reaffirming the dominant argument, Klein clearly supports a unidirectional 
relationship between technical factors and efficient motivation based on conventional 
new institutional economics. Basic technical characteristics, and especially asset 
specificity, along with bounded rationality and opportunism, produce motivation 
problems that can only be managed using the most efficient institution (here, vertical 
integration which guarantees transaction cost minimization).  
 
Coase suggests an alternative interpretation of the GM/FB case which supports the 
idea that H0 can be contested by historical facts. In abstract terms, part of Coase’s 
contribution can be viewed, therefore, in terms of the distinction between deductive 
and inductive methods, as set out in the previous section. To him, asset specificity is 
only a potential rationale for vertical integration, not sufficiently high enough in the 
present case to justify vertical integration. Note that the idea of potential rationale is 
consistent with H0 being a developmental attractor. But the claim that this is not high 
enough in the present case suggests that the attractor is dominated by processes. Also 
note that Coase is not saying that hold up is in principle wrong, but is generally part of 
a wider analysis that has potentially multiple facets. Three reasons motivate Coase’s 
(2000, p. 15) argument. First, “What General Motors acquired in 1926 was the 40 
percent of the shares of Fisher Body that it did not already own”. Presumably, for 
advocates of the hold up principle, 60 percent ownership would normally have solved 
the problem and full integration would have not occurred. Second, “Fisher Body did 
not locate its plants far away from the General Motors assembly plants”. Here again, 
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the hold up principle does not hold. Finally, “it is also most implausible, for many 
reasons, that the Fisher brothers would have used inefficient methods of production”. 
Consequently, there is no evidence that a holdup occurred. H0 is thus not sustained by 
historical facts, and an alternative hypothesis is suggested (see Hypothesis H1, Table 
1 below): “Asset specificity (with or without hold up) is normally handled 
satisfactorily with long term contracts without requiring vertical integration”.  
 
Coase, therefore, appears to be suggesting that technical factors (i.e. asset specificity) 
are the point of departure for analysis of the case, but they do not necessarily produce 
efficient motivation problems (i.e. hold-up). We earlier characterized H0 in terms of a 
unidirectional link between technical factors and efficient motivation as an attractor of 
change. The alternative H1 questions the dominance of this linkage, for the GM/FB 
real case. Instead, technical factors are linked to long run issues, such as the complete 
acquisition of a company which was already partially owned, or the location of plants 
viewed as part of a broader strategy implemented by the acquired company, Fisher 
Body. In turn, these different long run elements had an impact on the methods of 
production of this latter company, which could have been be viewed as inefficient 
from outside, and especially from the acquirer point of view, i.e. General Motors. In 
short, Coase appears to be suggesting that we must recognize the technical drivers of 
change and, following this, the developmental processes that resulted. We can view 
this as an alternative to H0 as a developmental attractor. 
 
Freeland also contests H0, and suggests that hold up never occurred. He advances a 
different interpretation of the case based on the role of human assets in determining 
the boundaries of the firm. To him, vertical integration was “caused primarily by the 
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desire to acquire and retain the specialized knowledge and services of the Fisher 
brothers” (Freeland, 2000, 35). Further, he  shows that, if hold up occurred, it is after 
integration since, because of their specialized knowledge, competences and skills, the 
Fisher brothers could significantly shape the strategies of the integrated company. 
Thus, we can define H2 (see Table 1 below), supported by Freeland, according to 
which “Access to specialized human capabilities favours vertical integration which 
may, in turn, produce holdup situations”. Using our earlier interpretation, the link 
from technical conditions to efficient motivation is not selected. Instead, the 
implementation of a long run strategy, in terms of how to recruit and retain human 
capital, is claimed to have had an impact on technical factors (i.e. knowledge, 
competences and skills). Furthermore, an additional complexity here is that the 
specialized knowledge, and the resulting organizational position, can influence 
strategies, i.e. inefficient motivation outcomes can have dysfunctional effects if not 
adequately treated. We see, therefore, once again, an apparent emphasis on drivers 
and processes. But we see a subtle difference compared to earlier discussion. Coase 
emphasized technical drivers of change, but for Freeland, the drivers are viewed as 
organizational rather than technical. 
 
Finally, Casadesus-Masanell and Spulber also contest H0. First, they stress that “the 
historical record indicates close collaboration and trust between the companies, which 
contradicts supposed contract failures. The extensive participation of the Fisher 
brothers in GM management beginning in 1921 also indicates an absence of alleged 
opportunism by Fisher” (Casadesus-Masanell and Spulber, 2000, p. 68). Second, “the 
initial acquisition in 1919 also accompanied by substantial investment by GM in 
Fisher and a voting trust arrangement in which executives from the two companies 
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had equal control over Fisher’s board of directors, which contradict the need for 
property rights to exercise control” (ibid). Third, “Fisher Body did not price 
opportunistically under its manufacturing contract. Many Fisher Body plants already 
were located next to GM plants before 1926” (ibid, p. 69). In addition, “the supposed 
transaction-specific investment in metal presses and dies is inconsistent with Fisher’s 
manufacturing technology, which was wood based and labor intensive and therefore 
flexible and not transaction specific” (ibid). This leads the authors to suggest an 
alternative hypothesis, more closely oriented towards the coordination of production 
in an innovative context: 
… the closed auto bodies made by Fisher represented quality and comfort and 
were a source of competitive advantage for GM in its competition with Ford… 
Vertically integrating into auto body manufacturing allowed GM better to 
coordinate the management of inventories, production and purchasing given 
the transportation, communications, and data-processing costs existing at that 
time. (ibid)  
 
Thus H3 (see Table 1 below) can be termed as “the coordination of production in an 
innovative context stimulating vertical integration”. The innovative context here 
implies that technical factors, such as plant location and pricing issues, were an aspect 
of the long run strategy of the acquired company. This suggests that the key 
conceptual linkages were from long-run strategy to technical factors (as well as the 
reverse). Also, close collaboration and voting trust arrangements between the acquired 
and acquiring firms were shaped by, and also shaped, long run focus. This suggests 
that, in addition to strategy and technical factors being inter-linked, strategy and 
motivation were also inter-connected. Hence we see, once again, an emphasis on 
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drivers and processes. In both cases, technical and organizational factors are 
introduced. 
 
New evidence on the GM/FB case is especially interesting to us since it can be 
interpreted as indicating the development of an integrated approach to the firm. 
Though empirically driven research sustained for a long time the predominance of 
vertical integration by transaction costs economics, and to some extent confirmed a 
unique body of analysis to be tested, it seems that things have now changed. As 
summarized in Table 1, and on the basis of a new series of observations on historical 
archives, H0 is confirmed by some authors but contested by others. In particular, the 
significance of efficiency seeking behavior and the adoption of optimal structures as 
developmental attractors is downgraded and emphasis is placed on firm specific 
developmental drivers and processes. 
 
Table 1 here, see end. 
 
When H0 is rejected, new propositions for theoretical investigation of the economics 
of the firm are systematically provided. Moreover, these new propositions tend to 
move progressively from a vision of the firm as an economizer or follower to the firm 
as a strategizer or leader; and from a dominance of attractors to the recognition of 
processes. These new propositions stimulate the investigation of a wider spectrum of 
conceptual links to interpret historical facts, which complements earlier 
understanding. This recognition of a wider theoretical spectrum leads to the 
economics of the firm having a greater empirical relevance and suggests the 
importance of a more general integrated perspective on the firm. 
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This section will generalize the implications of the GM/FB case study in terms of how 
we might analyze the economics of the firm as both a technical and institutional unit. 
To reiterate the earlier summary: the economics of the firm can be understood in two 
distinct contexts, technical and institutional. The technical context involves the 
production of goods and services in particular market settings. Two alternative 
institutional views on the firm appear to exist in economics: the firm as an efficient 
motivator and the firm as a long-run strategic unit in which emphasis is placed on 
generating strategic focus. Of course, any real world firm is both an efficiency seeking 
and strategic unit – with the interactions involved being central to the economics of 
the firm. This is hardly an original observation. For example, Barnard (1938) 
emphasized that both effectiveness and efficiency are necessary for survival. In 
addition, he noted that, in the long-run, efficiency is the extent to which a firm can 
satisfy the motives of individual members. This is obviously a somewhat different 
definition than that characteristically adopted in economics including transaction cost 
theory. It follows, therefore, that an important complexity is that the dominance of 
efficiency seeking over strategy may involve different characteristics compared to a 
reverse dominance, a point that is emphasized by, for example, Gehani (2002) in his 
discussion of Barnard. 
5. An integrated perspective on the firm 
 
Figure 3 here, see end 
 
Presenting the institutional approach to the firm in the manner suggested here, i.e. as 
essentially two general schools of thought, reveals that the linkages are to some extent 
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partial or incomplete. To develop an integrated approach to the firm a more fully 
connected set of linkages can be recognized. In schematic terms, this fully connected 
model is presented in Figure 3. In addition, this diagram draws explicit connections 
between the various linkages and the GM/FB case study. Link (1) defines 
conventional new institutional economics, as considered in section two. Link (2) 
defines the competence and related approaches to the firm, as  considered earlier. 
These first two approaches constitute what might be considered the recognized 
literature on the economics of the firm. For this reason, they are perhaps less 
interesting than the ‘alternative’ frameworks defined by links (3)-(6). 
 
The nature of link (3) can be explained in the following way. The causation operates 
from motivation systems to the technical characteristics of the firm i.e. the reverse of 
traditional new institutional economics. For example, Morroni (1992) suggests that 
organizational indivisibilities, arising from the management of transaction costs, 
produce economies of scale. These organizational indivisibilities are based on 
management of search, negotiation and/or policing matters i.e. control of factors of 
production. Using a standard production function analysis of the firm, a change in 
factor productivities will change production based scale economies and hence 
influence firm size and market structure. But for real firms, managing real change in 
real time, we need not assume that organizational search, negotiation and policing is 
necessarily efficient in the manner suggested by new institutional economists. Hence, 
link (3) may, or may not, promote long-run firm sustainability. Either way of 
conceptualizing link (3) suggests the same conclusion: the management of firm 
motivation can impact on the technical characteristics of the firm. In terms of the 
earlier case study, the possible relevance of this link was suggested by Freeland: if the 
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impact of firm strategies on motivation systems is not recognized (this is link 5 in 
Figure 3, discussed below) such systems can adversely affect technical factors, i.e. 
can negatively impact on long-run viability.  
 
A possible implication of the negative as well as positive aspects of link (3) is that it 
might help to explain why nearly all firms eventually disappear. Continuing with the 
work of Barnard (1938), firms tend not to be long lived because they cannot guarantee 
both effectives and efficiency on a continuing basis. His view of long-run efficiency, 
as considered above, implies that the motivations of individuals within a firm guide 
long-run (technical) development, i.e. link (3). In addition, it is the basis for his view 
that firms are cooperative systems that are subject to breakdown. Of course, within a 
more narrowly defined economics, Marshall’s views on firm life cycles are not 
inconsistent with negative as well as positive aspects to link (3). 
 
The characteristics of link (4) can be explained in ways suggested by Langlois and 
Robertson (1995). With firm strategic investment decisions, i.e. decisions involving 
long-run focus, the variable costs of existing projects will be compared with the total 
costs of new projects. With significant sunk fixed costs a bias will therefore exist 
towards current ventures and technologies. This bias will generate inertia in the long-
run focus of firms. Of course, this inertia is more viable with a degree of monopoly 
power for existing firms. Among other things, this potential importance of monopoly 
power implies that link (4) may be less relevant in ‘new economy’ Schumpeterian 
industries that Schmalensee (2000) depicts as ‘winner takes most’ markets. The 
creative destruction in such industries undermines the significance of existing sunk 
assets.  
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In terms of the earlier case, link (4) is emphasized in different ways by Coase with his 
explanation of the firm as a pool of resources, and Casadesus-Masanell and Spulber. 
The emphasis here was on a technical driver to firm change, but as the change impacts 
on a firm’s long-run focus, the analytical emphasis is on the process of change, not the 
pull of an attractor. A possible complexity for link (4) is the existence of sunk 
investments with technological complementarities, as explored in Chandler (1977). 
For example, the production and distribution of a good might involve sunk, fixed real 
and organizational assets. The complementarities involved produce coordination 
problems in the presence of environmental uncertainty. Because of the sunk and fixed 
nature of the assets, any coordination failures produce significant efficiency losses. 
These losses are not due to coordination issues in the context of agent motivation (i.e. 
link 1), but because of the technological complementarities involved. The solution (in 
Chandler’s case, by vertical integration) implies that technical characteristics channel 
long-run organizational characteristics. 
 
Link (5), from motivation systems to long-run focus, can be considered the 
organizational analogue of link (4). Given the sunk costs of setting up and managing 
contracting and motivation systems, a bias towards the use of existing organizational 
methods and processes will be introduced. If strategic re-orientation involves 
fundamental organizational change, such re-orientation can be rationally blocked, i.e. 
long-run strategies and focus will be constrained and channelled in particular 
directions. Mintzberg (1990) suggests that organizational rigidities and inertia might 
exist because strategies are filtered through existing learning processes. Similarly, 
Nooteboom (2004) suggests that recognizing the centrality of individual and 
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collective cognition implies the existence of firm specific path dependencies, because 
of the sunk costs of cognitive efficiency rendering it domain limited (see also 
Nooteboom, 2009). In terms of the earlier case, link (5) is emphasized by Freeland, 
and Casadesus-Masanell and Spulber. But in both cases, this link is part of a larger 
explanation. For Freeland, if the organizational impact on long-run focus is not 
managed properly, there will be adverse effects on technical factors (link 3). For 
Casadesus-Masanell and Spulber, the effect of link (5) has the beneficial impact via 
link (2). 
 
The nature of link (6) can be summarized under the shorthand of strategizing or 
economizing. Or as indicated above, the same idea can be captured under the 
distinction between firms acting as leaders or followers. If firms act as leaders, 
investment in organizational assets is required to enable the development of new 
strategies or to manage the flexibilities required to effectively exploit market 
opportunities. Such assets are not necessary for follower firms (Langlois, 1986). In 
turn, the required capabilities for effective innovation and flexibility will have an 
impact on organizational motivation systems. In short, organisational motivation need 
not be simply an efficient response to exogenous technical characteristics, but may 
depend on long-run objectives. One way of conceptualizing these impacts is to 
distinguish between long-run and short-run economizing. With short-run 
economizing, firms respond to cost and revenue potential. For long-run economizing, 
cost and revenue potential are endogenous to firm strategies, with higher costs being 
required for the management of faster or more fundamental change. In terms of the 
above diagram, link (5) is based on the dominance of short-run economizing, whereas 
link (6) has long-run economizing being dominant. From the case study, link (6) is 
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highlighted by Casadesus-Masanell and Spulber and so is viewed as the interaction
 
 
between motivation systems and focus, a feature of the analysis developed shortly. 
The integrated model suggested in the previous section indicates the potential 
complexity involved when analyzing the firm in  concrete detail. In addition to 
identifying links (1)-(6), the complexities involved can be increased by combining the 
links. This combination is clear from the earlier case study, and is also done by 
theorists who suggest that competence and transaction cost approaches are 
complements rather than substitutes (for example, Foss, 1993; Langlois and 
Robertson, 1995; Hodgson, 1998). But this issue of complementarities is perhaps 
more involved than basing an explanation of firm development on more than one of 
the links in Figure 3. It was suggested at the outset of the discussion that, in principle, 
the complexities involved with firm development require recognition of three sets of 
factors: (1) the prime movers or drivers of change, (2) change processes, and (3) 
attractors of change. If a black-box optimizing view of the firm is adopted, factors (1) 
and (2) are effectively removed, or side-stepped, from discussion of firm 
development. Drivers are analyzed as exogenous changes in demand and/or cost 
functions. The assumption of optimizing responses to any changes collapses analysis 
of firm development into a comparative static framework and so marginalizes issues 
of change processes. Hence, the characteristic economic approach to firm 
development concentrates on the equilibrium attractors of firm development. To map 
this analytical approach into an interpretation of actual firm development produces 
potentially partial and biased analysis, as indicated above with the case of General 
Motors and Fisher Body. 
6. Analyzing firm development 
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In general terms, the drivers of change can be viewed as any factors that produce a 
shift in firm long-run focus or strategy. It is clear from earlier discussion that such 
factors can be both technical and organizational. Different theoretical traditions view 
these drivers as external and/or internal to the firm. For example, traditional black box 
theories view drivers of change as exogenous environmental shocks to which 
organizations respond. On the other hand, competence views of the firm allow change 
to be internally generated, as exemplified in Penrose’s (1959) view of management 
that emphasizes a firm’s unique productive opportunity3
 
. In terms of the integrated 
framework suggested above, if we recognize firm change as an evolutionary process, 
these drivers of change are accounted for by links (4) and (5), i.e. the technical and 
organizational impacts on long-run focus.  
Change processes can be viewed, in general terms, as the impact of shifting firm focus 
on technical or organization firm issues. In terms of the earlier integrated model of 
firm development, these processes involve links from long-run focus towards 
technical factors (link 2) and motivation systems (link 6). Finally, the attractors of 
firm development are either organizational or technical. Organizational attractors are 
equilibrium responses to ex-ante technical conditions (link 1). Technical attractors are 
the equilibrium responses to ex-ante organizational conditions (link 3).  
 
It follows from this discussion that the integrated framework considered in the 
previous section can be viewed as combining the drivers, processes and attractors of 
                                                 
3 A complexity here is that Penrose’s ‘productive opportunities’ are decomposable into ‘subjective 
productive opportunities’ which are imagined and ‘objective productive opportunities’ which 
correspond more to our long run focus. 
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firm development.4 In addition, the drivers, processes and attractors of change can 
each be viewed as either organizational or technical. But, while a sequential view of 
drivers, processes and attractors is a useful heuristic, we should guard against an 
oversimplified analysis of firm development. In this regard, the following 
complexities would seem to be important:5
1. If we recognize the input from resource or competence views of the firm, the 
connections between drivers and processes will be firm specific.  
 
2. There will be “feedback” effects from processes to drivers based on firm 
cognition and knowledge development that involves learning and discovery. 
3. Attractors of change may be endogenous to processes if organizational or 
technical lock-in exists. This possibility of lock-in was highlighted in the 
earlier discussion. The extent to which attractors are endogenous to processes 
is an empirical issue. But a general principle is that endogenous attractors 
should be viewed as locally rather than globally efficient or optimal (North, 
1990; Arthur 1994). 
4. There will be additional “feedback effects” from attractors to processes if 
attractors imply significantly changed competitive conditions. 
 
Figure 4 here, see end 
 
The complexity implied by these comments is illustrated in Figure 4. To explore some 
of the issues involved here, and to move the discussion beyond the specific case study 
                                                 
4  This three stage analysis of firm development is informed by recent writing in evolutionary 
economics that emphasizes three general evolutionary stages involving discovery, process and 
equilibrium. See Dopfer, Foster and Potts (2004). 
5 A referee for this journal quite correctly pointed out that all intellectual development is based on what 
Popper would call conjectures. Like scientific conjectures, the complexities suggested here are 
obviously contingent rather than definitive. 
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reported earlier, two brief examples will be offered that are somewhat standard in the 
literature on the economics of the firm:  analysis of multinational companies (MNCs) 
and discussion of diversification.  
 
With respect to the first of these, it has been claimed that transaction costs, or 
internalization theory as it is called in the MNC area, are an adequate explanation of 
multinational development (for example Hennart, 1982). But Dunning (for example 
1993), based on detailed empirical investigation, has developed his own eclectic 
paradigm, or the OLI framework based on Organizational, Location and 
Internalization factors. In his own words (1993, p.75-6): 
[The OLI paradigm], while accepting the logic of internalisation theory, argues 
that it is not, in itself, sufficient to explain the level and structure of the 
production of a country’s own firms outside their national boundaries, or of 
the production of foreign-owned firms in its midst.  
In addition 
 
In the static model of internalisation, [owner-specific] variables … are taken to 
be exogenous… However, viewing the growth of the firm as a dynamic 
process, the legitimacy of this assumption is questionable. For a firm’s current 
core competences … are the outcome of past decisions which, at the time they 
were taken, were endogenous to the firm. 
 
These comments are perfectly consistent with the unified approach to the firm 
developed here. For MNCs location specific factors are institutional as well as 
physical, and constrain and hence impact  firm specific objectives. In terms of the 
earlier integrated model, these are external impacts that have an effect on firms via the 
-28- 
drivers of change i.e. links (4) and (5). In addition, to understand adequately MNC 
development, firm specific processes and (internalization) attractors must be 
recognized. 
 
With respect to the second example to be suggested here, i.e. diversification, there are 
once again somewhat standard transaction cost accounts (for example Williamson 
1985; Teece, 1982). But, from an empirical perspective, a key observation is that the 
process of diversification is more complex than recognizing equilibrium attractors. 
With respect to diversification processes, it is somewhat standard to link these 
processes to merger activity and to recognize that many mergers do not improve firm 
performance (for example Ravenscraft and Scherer, 1987). Many possible 
explanations exist for this allegedly irrational diversification activity, but in the 
current context, two may be emphasiszd. First, managerial objectives may dominate 
decision making (Mueller, 2003) perhaps in the context of the overestimation of 
compatibilities and the underestimation of differences between merged entities. 
Second, firms may behave as Cournot [Stackelberg?] followers and not take account 
of the impact of merger activity on market structure (Martin, 2002). In either case, 
these explanations imply that a full account of diversification, and the merger 
processes involved, requires recognition of firm specific objectives, i.e. in terms of 
Figure 3, the long-run focus of a firm. In short, as with MNCs and vertical integration, 
an adequate analysis of diversification that recognizes the complexities suggested by 
empirical observation, would appear to require an integrated approach to firm based 
on drivers, processes and attractors. 
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These examples, and the case developed earlier, would appear to suggest that two 
ways exist to manage the complexities involved with the economics of the firm. First, 
emphasis might be placed on identifying the key linkages in particular developmental 
circumstances. This is exemplified in the modern life-cycle based analysis of 
technologies, industries and firms (Klepper, 1997). But an implication here is that 
linkages relevant in different developmental stages and with different firms need not 
be the same. Such a research strategy is empirically driven. The second approach is 
theoretically driven: a particular conceptual framework can be adopted, but non-core 
frameworks (linkages) can be recognized and introduced as constraints. Once again, 
the nature of the constraints is likely to be contingent on developmental 
circumstances.  
 
An important complexity exists with either the empirical or theoretical strategies. 
Some frameworks may be complements, but others may be inconsistent. In addition, 
the nature of any complementary or inconsistent frameworks may be contingent on 
evolutionary circumstances. For example, if managerial objectives dominate merger 
and diversification decisions, it is by no means obvious that transaction cost reasoning 
can be used as a developmental attractor because the decisions involved are not 
efficiency seeking. Alternatively, if organizational or technical attractors are 
important, this will undermine managerial objectives. A second example concerns the 
possible importance of firm strategic lock-in or path dependency. If this exists, which 
itself is an empirical matter, it would suggest that change processes dominate the 
economics of the firm. But if, following Figure 4, changed competitive conditions 
undermine path dependencies, this is likely to reinforce the analytical importance of 
drivers and attractors, with path dependency becoming inconsistent with this. Note 
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that this importance of competitive conditions is likely to introduce the significance of 
life-cycle considerations, as mentioned in the previous section in the context of 
Barnard and Marshall. In short, an economics of the firm consistent with the case 
study, and theoretical generalization of this study, would seem to suggest that analysis 
should be open to different frameworks being relevant in different circumstances. 
 
The primary claim of this paper is that an integrated approach to the firm is necessary 
if the complexities of “real” firm development are to be effectively analyzed. Two 
sets of complexities are suggested here. First, the hardly original claim that any real 
world firm is both technical and institutional. Second, that firm development involves 
three general stages: prime movers or drivers of firm change, change processes, and 
attractors for firm change. Using these two sets of complexities as a guide, it is shown 
that existing approaches to the firm can grouped into six categories based on 
particular combinations of the stages of firm development that are addressed and 
whether technical or institutional factors are viewed as primary.  
7. Conclusion 
 
These themes are explored, initially, using the well-known case of General Motors – 
Fisher Body integration. It is shown that different interpretations of this case map 
directly into the different conceptual linkages suggested in the first part of the 
discussion. It follows that potentially all explanations appear relevant, but in different 
contexts. This conclusion is further developed in terms of an integrated perspective on 
the firm that generalizes the material presented in the case study. While the case study 
used here, and generalization of this study, indicate the richness and relevance of an 
integrated approach to firm development, further work both case based and more 
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general is required to indicate the manner in which the integrated approach suggested 
here can be used in different circumstances involving different industrial and 
evolutionary contexts. It follows that, even though different perspectives on the firm 
can claim empirical validity for particular approaches, these claims are incomplete or 
biased as general explanations of firm development. In short, while there are obvious 
advantages to an intellectual division of labor, these advantages should not obscure 
the potential shortcomings, or partial interpretations, offered by different approaches 
and the more complementary nature of a more integrated approach. 
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Table 1: A synthesis of new evidence on the General Motors / Fisher Body case 
Empirical 
implications  
of models 
H0: holdup in presence of asset specificity explains vertical 
integration  
=> new institutional economics is confirmed 
=> key link: technical factors → efficient motivation 
Empirical 
observations 
4 observations based on historical archives:  
(1) Klein; (2) Coase; (3) Freeland; (4) Casadesus-Masanell and 
Spulber.  
Acceptance/Reject 
of hypotheses 
1) H0 is confirmed  
2) H0 is contested 
3) H0 is contested 
4) H0 is contested 
New formulations 1) no new formulation  
=> attractors of change:  
technical factors → efficient motivation 
  
2) H1: Asset specificity (with or without hold up) is normally 
handled satisfactorily with long term contracts without requiring 
vertical integration. 
=> technical drivers and processes of change: 
technical factors → firm strategy 
firm strategy → technical factors 
 
3) H2: Access to specialized human capabilities favours vertical 
integration which may, in turn, produce holdup situations.  
=> organisational drivers and processes of change: 
technical factors → firm strategy 
motivation → firm strategy  
 
4) H3: Coordination of production in an innovative context 
stimulating vertical integration.  
=> technical and organisational drivers and processes of change: 
technical factors → firm strategy 
firm strategy → technical factors  
motivation → firm strategy  
firm strategy → motivation 
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technical 
characteristics 
Figure 1: The firm as efficient motivator 
→ goods & 
services 
→ motivation → efficiency → performance 
 
 
long-run 
focus 
Figure 2: The firm as long-run focus 
→ technical - 
organisation 
characteristics 
→ productive 
opportunity  
→ goods & 
services 
→ performance 
 
 
 
Figure 3: An integrated model of the firm:  
with evidence from GM/FB vertical integration
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Figure 4: Conceptualising firm development 
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